Economic theories of trade agreements identify a number of potential linkages between trade liberalization and the subsequent re-imposition of import protection under safeguard exceptions. To our knowledge, this paper is the first product-level study to explicitly investigate the link between liberalization and the subsequent re-imposition of such protection. We overcome endogeneity problems by exploiting tariff-cut heterogeneity across products within India, a country that underwent a major exogenous tariff reform program in the early 1990s and subsequently became a frequent user of new safeguard and antidumping import restrictions. First, we provide structural estimates from a Grossman and Helpman (1994) model modified to examine determinants of Indian antidumping and safeguard use, and we find that products with larger tariff cuts between 1990 and 1997 are associated with an increase in new import protection in the early 2000s. Second, estimates from a reduced-form model confirm these results and suggest that they are economically important -i.e., a one standard deviation increase in the size of the tariff cut away from the mean increases the predicted probability by almost 50% of such new protection. Third, we find heterogeneity in the size of the effect across sectors as tariff cuts are an important determinant of such new protection within the steel, iron and paper industries, but not within industrial chemicals, for which there is strong evidence of retaliatory or collusive effects. Combined, our results are consistent with the theory that access to such policy exceptions dilutes the potential commitment device role played by trade agreements. The results also provide one explanation for separate estimates in the literature that the magnitude of import reduction associated with India's use of antidumping is similar to the initial import expansion associated with its tariff reform. Finally, we interpret the implications of our results for the burgeoning research literature examining the effects of liberalization on India's micro-level development.
Introduction
Economic theorists have identified a central tension that occurs when a trade agreement includes provisions for policy "exceptions" -typically referred to as "safeguards" -that allow for a government to subsequently re-implement conditional import protection after trade liberalization occurs. On one hand, Bagwell and Staiger (1990) illustrate how safeguards can play a positive role in maintaining a cooperative trade agreement and relatively low tariffs in the face of unexpected shocks. 1 On the other hand, an important implication of a second major strand of the theoretical literature on trade agreements (e.g., Staiger and Tabellini, 1987; Rodriguez-Clare 1998, 2007) is that ex ante inclusion of such a safeguard exception can create time-consistency or commitment problems that make it difficult for a government to implement even Pareto-improving trade liberalizing reform announcements ex post.
Despite important concerns these theories raise for understanding links between trade liberalization and such import-restricting policy exceptions, economists have found it elusive to empirically test their relevance in practice. There are a number of fundamental reasons for the lack of empirical progress, not the least of which is concern over policy endogeneity that creates challenges for identification.
This paper provides a new approach that overcomes these endogeneity problems and allows us to empirically investigate the link between trade liberalization and use of exceptions permitting new import protection. First, our setting is the "natural experiment" created by India's exogenously-mandated tariff reform program of the 1990s. Focusing on a single country with exogenous tariff cuts allows examination of the effect of the tariff cut treatment on subsequent response of new import protection. 2 Second, we 1 In addition to Bagwell and Staiger (1990) , other motivations for including ex ante safeguard provisions into a trade agreement are that it can provide insurance that encourages hesitant policymakers to liberalize. See Fischer and Prusa (2003) for one theoretical approach to modeling this relationship. See also Bagwell and Staiger (2005) . 2 The first endogeneity concern is that a country's trade liberalization is typically not an exogenous event, but instead is part of a negotiated preferential or multilateral trade agreement. In such cases, endogenous factors may determine both the level of initial liberalization and subsequent resort to exceptions for new protection. A second endogeneity concern may arise if the trade liberalizing country is simultaneously negotiating the terms of the "exceptions" in the writing of the trade agreement -i.e., not only the question of whether to have any exceptions at all, but also the legal and economic evidentiary criterion that must be met in order to trigger the exceptions. This is also not of concern for our context as India's accession to the WTO was part of the "Single Undertaking" which meant India would be subject to established GATT/WTO rules governing antidumping and safeguard exceptions. focus on the product-level link between India's tariff cuts and its subsequent resort to the liberal trade policy "exceptions" of newly applied safeguard and antidumping trade restrictions, which themselves are relatively substitutable forms of new import protection. 3 Our approach is to use the Indian setting and exploit cross-product variation to examine whether there is a link between size of the initial tariff cut and the subsequent resort to such new import restrictions.
In addition to the exogeneity of its tariff reform, India is an excellent setting to test for this link for a number of reasons. Subsequent to the initiation of its tariff reform program in 1991, India transformed from being a non-user of policy exceptions such as antidumping and safeguards to becoming the WTO system's most frequent user (WTO, 2007a,b) of both types of import restrictions over the next decade. Nevertheless, while the response to the Indian tariff reform program appears well timed with the subsequent rise in filings and implementation of these safeguards and antidumping policy exceptions, is there a product-level link? The top two panels of figure 1 illustrate suggestive evidence of the basic relationship between the relative sizes of the 1990s tariff cuts and subsequent antidumping use for products within two of India's major users of antidumping -the iron and steel as well as the paper industries. The figures indicate that products that subsequently sought antidumping protection in the early 2000s, on average, started with higher tariffs and received larger tariff cuts over the 1990s.
Our econometric analysis investigates whether this suggestive evidence of a relationship between the size of trade liberalization and subsequent resort to these policy exceptions is economically and statistically important. Our formal approach proceeds in two steps. First, we begin by estimating the structural Grossman and Helpman (1994) political economy model suitably modified to examine this new setting -i.e., determinants of Indian antidumping and safeguard use over the early 2000s. 4 We examine whether product-level requests for new antidumping and safeguard protection are based both on determinants suggested by the prior literature and the determinant of interest for our analysis -i.e., the depth of the product-level Indian import tariff cut between 1990 and 1997. Our results suggest structural parameters broadly consistent with previous research applying the model to other countries and other trade policy settings. Furthermore, from this modified setting we provide evidence of a significant negative relationship between the size of the product-level trade liberalization undertaken between 1990
and 1997 and the subsequent resort to new protection in the early 2000s -i.e., the larger the good's initial tariff cut, the more antidumping and safeguards protection the Indian producers of that good subsequently demanded and received ex post.
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Viewed from the theoretical literature on trade agreements, we interpret this evidence as consistent with the implicit concerns raised by Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and RodriguezClare (1998, 2007) -i.e ., that India used new product-specific protection in the early 2000s to escape from 1990s trade liberalization announcements that, ex post, it found too deep to sustain. We present additional evidence in support of this relationship in a final section of the paper in which we investigate a previously unexamined margin of the data on the duration of time that measures stay imposed. There we 4 The first papers to estimate structural versions of the Grossman and Helpman model on data for the United States include Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) . While there are too many papers in the subsequent literature to cite here, Cadot, Grether, and Olarreaga (2003) is the first paper that we are aware of that applies the Grossman and Helpman model to estimating determinants of Indian import protection. Nevertheless their study does not examine the questions of interest of this paper -i.e., specifically whether the model can be used to understand determinants of a particular trade policy (antidumping and/or safeguards) as well as whether there is a relationship between demands for such forms of protection and the size of past trade liberalization.
5 Staiger and Tabellini (1999) is one of the few attempts of which we are aware to empirically test the commitment theory of trade agreements, using U.S. data on sectoral exclusions in the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in comparison to tariff responses under the U.S. safeguard law. On the other hand, there are some related papers closer to our approach but which use much more aggregated data and which also do not attempt to deal with the endogeneity issues that we have identified. For example, Crowley (2007) is a cross-country, macro-level study relating the subsequent number of safeguard cases that a WTO member initiated between 1995 and 2000 to a measure of the member's average tariff cut undertaken in the Uruguay Round. Feinberg and Reynolds (2007) is a similar cross-country approach which focuses on antidumping alone and is carried out at a very aggregated industry level. Our approach differs from these two studies along a number of different dimensions, including that it focuses on a single country in which the tariff cuts were arguably exogenous thus forming the basis for a better natural experiment, it is conducted at the product (6-digit Harmonized System) level, it examines both antidumping and safeguard use, and the estimates derive from both reduced-form and structural econometric models.
illustrate evidence that, within the set of Indian products receiving antidumping protection, there is also a negative relationship between the length of protection under an antidumping measure and the size of the 1990s tariff cut. We thus find that "temporary" antidumping protection may be more likely to become "quasi-permanent" protection, the larger was the product's original tariff cut.
The second step of the econometric analysis complements the structural Grossman and Helpman approach by estimating a reduced-form model that exploits additional variation in our available data and allowing us to address a number of related questions raised by the theoretical literature. First, the evidence confirms the structural Grossman and Helpman model estimates of a negative relationship between the size of the Indian 1990s tariff cut and the subsequent resort to antidumping protection in the early 2000s.
Second, we use this approach to interpret the economic size of this effect and to investigate the industrylevel source of this relationship. We find that the average effect is large -i.e., a one standard deviation increase in the tariff cut away from the mean increases the predicted probability of new antidumping or safeguard use by 50%. 6 The negative relationship is driven by product-level variation within relatively large Indian importing industries such as iron, steel and paper, which are also major Indian and global users of antidumping.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, we find no evidence of a link between 1990s tariff cuts and subsequent resort to antidumping by India's dominant sectoral user of antidumping -the industrial chemicals sector -a result consistent with the suggestive evidence of the lower panel in figure 1 . We exploit characteristics of the export source of the Indian imported products and an additionally available margin of the data to address the question of what does determine cross-product use of antidumping within the industrial chemicals sector if it is not variation in the size of the tariff cuts. We find that India's antidumping use across products within industrial chemicals targets imports from exporting firms in 6 Interpreting the size of our results for India suggests they are likely to have an economically important implication for trade flows as well. Indeed, our results that link trade policies (tariffs and antidumping/safeguards) over time provide evidence to confirm the implicit hypothesis presented in Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2006) , whose gravity model estimates find that the trade decrease resulting from India's antidumping policy is of the same magnitude as the trade increase that resulted from its earlier trade liberalization.
trading partners that previously targeted India's own chemical-producing exporters with antidumping.
This provides further evidence consistent with the long-held theory that antidumping is used by certain industries as a retaliatory mechanism to enforce collusive, international market sharing arrangements.
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Our combined results allow us to confirm the results found in a variety of research settings -i.e., that inclusion of trade policy exceptions such as safeguards and antidumping into trade agreements leads to multiple political-economic motives for subsequent use by industries and policymakers.
Finally, we note that our identification of a link between India's 1990s tariff reform and the subsequent use of new forms of import protection via antidumping and safeguard policy is potentially important for other areas economic research. A substantial literature has evolved that uses the size of the exogenous Indian tariff cuts to examine the impact of trade liberalization on other fundamental and microeconomic changes (poverty, productivity growth, labor demand, etc.) transforming the Indian economy. 8 Our results suggest that relying on only tariff cuts to proxy for trade liberalization in certain Indian industries runs the risk of substantial mismeasurement.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting of India's tariff reform in the 1990s and the subsequent resort to exceptions such as antidumping and safeguards. In section 3 we modify the Grossman and Helpman (1994) structural model to estimate the relationship between Indian use of antidumping and safeguards and its tariff reform. This section also describes our data and presents our baseline estimates and first round of sensitivity analysis. Section 4 presents the alternative reduced-form framework that both documents the robustness of our results and allows us to explore additional questions. Section 5 concludes.
7 See Prusa (1992) and Hoekman and Mavroidis (1996) , for example, for discussions. Recent papers finding evidence consistent with retaliatory effects on different samples of antidumping use data include Blonigen and Bown (2003) , Prusa and Skeath (2002) , Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) and Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008) . Note that none of these earlier empirical papers match antidumping use across countries at the actual level of product disaggregation (6-digit Harmonized System) that we have done here. 8 Examples of recent studies of India examining such links include the relationship between liberalization and industry/firm productivity (Krishna and Mitra, 1998; Topalova, 2004) , poverty (Topalova, 2005) , the demand for labor (Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy, 2007) as well as child labor (Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova, 2007) .
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India's Tariff Reform, Antidumping, and Safeguards
Trade liberalization in India in the 1990s
Between 1947 and the late 1980s, India followed an inward-oriented development strategy. A combination of external shocks in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to large macroeconomic imbalances, and as a result, India requested a stand-by arrangement from the International Monetary Fund in August of 1991. Among the conditions for the arrangement was that India had to implement major structural reforms, including trade liberalization, financial sector reform and tax reform (Cerra and Saxena, 2002) .
The trade reform started in 1991 and was completed within the export-import policy announced in the government's Eighth Plan in 1992, which outlined a program of tariff reductions for the next five years on the basis of the 1991 agreement with the IMF (Pursell, Kishor, and Gupta, 2007) . 9 The government had to meet strict compliance deadlines, and it chose to implement the reform abruptly so as to avoid the emergence of potential opposition and thus without time to analyze or debate its distributive effects (Topalova, 2006) . Such tariff reform characteristics point to its exogenous nature.
As additional evidence on the exogeneity of the tariff reductions, Edmonds, Pavcnik and Topalova (2007) report a marked linear relationship between the pre-reform tariff levels and the tariff cuts by industry -which we also confirm using our data -deriving from the fact that the IMF mandated a reduction in both the tariff levels and their dispersion. Moreover, Topalova (2005) regresses the tariff change on late 1980s industry characteristics, including factor shares, concentration, employment, wages, productivity and others, and finds that tariff changes are not correlated with industry characteristics.
Prior to the IMF arrangement, the 1990-1991 Indian import-weighted average tariff was 87 percent, the simple average was 128 percent, and some tariffs were over 300 percent (Srinivasan, 2001 ).
The maximum tariff fell from 355 percent in 1990-1991 to 150 percent in 1991-1992 and 30.8 percent in 2002-2003 . The weighted average tariff decreased from 87 percent in 1990-1991 to 24.6 percent in 1996-9 Even though India was a member of the GATT, it did not participate in tariff-reducing GATT rounds (Edmonds, Pavcnik and Topalova, 2006) . Topalova (2004) also describes these five-year plans as having been carried out largely as they were originally announced.
1997 before it gradually increased to 38.5 percent in 2001-2002. 10 Finally, the standard deviation of tariffs fell from 41 percent to 15 percent between 1991 and 1997 (Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy, 2007 .
Because of the exogenous nature of India's IMF-mandated trade liberalization in the 1990s, economists have used it as a "natural experiment" case study to test the impact of trade liberalization on many different questions concerning fundamental microeconomic activity. However, one concern that we examine is the extent to which this exogenous reduction in import tariffs is positively associated with the subsequent re-application of new forms of import protection in India via WTO-permitted exceptions such as the imposition of safeguards and antidumping import restrictions.
2.2
India's antidumping and safeguard policies and use 10 The increase in applied tariffs after 1997 coincided with a significant lifting of quantitative restrictions (Narayanan, 2006) and was possible because India's tariff bindings from the Uruguay Round were set at much higher levels than the applied rates (Srinivasan, 2001) . The simple average tariff rate fell from 128 percent in 1990-1991 to 34.4 percent in 1997-1998 and then increased to 40.2 percent in 1998-99 but continued decreasing after that (Narayanan, 2006) . 11 Our analysis draws on the publicly available Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2007a) This also conforms with the aggregated gravity-model results of Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2006) , who estimate that India experienced a 10.2% annual reduction in imports as a result of its own antidumping trade restrictions, which is of a similar magnitude as the annual average growth in its imports of 11.3% it has been experiencing since the beginning of its trade liberalization reform in 1991.
The Grossman and Helpman Econometric Approach and Results

Econometric model
Our first econometric approach builds on the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of trade protection.
Their approach has become the leading political economy model of trade protection as it begins from first principles and derives a set of testable predictions about the determinants of protection based on government-industry interaction. The model assumes a small open economy in which there is a numeraire good produced only with labor, and i = 1, …, n non-numeraire goods produced with labor and a specific factor. The specific factor owners may organize into lobby groups and simultaneously offer the government a contribution schedule that maps a government policy choice into a campaign contribution.
In the second stage, the government selects the trade policy vector to maximize a weighted sum of contributions and social welfare. The model provides the following equation for equilibrium tariffs:
where i t is the ad valorem tariff; i I is an indicator variable that equals one if the sector is organized into a lobby and zero otherwise; L α denotes the fraction of the population that owns some specific factor; a is the weight that the government places on social welfare relative to political contributions; i z is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports; and i ε is the absolute value of the elasticity of import demand defined over the world price as follows: We apply the Grossman and Helpman model predictions to the case of India. Assume that equation (1) holds for 1990 -i.e., the year prior to India's trade policy reform and thus the last year that its tariffs were determined endogenously. Subsequent to the August 1991 IMF agreement, its tariff was affected by an exogenous mandate, suggesting that by 1997, India's sector i applied tariff is given by:
16 To obtain i ε from the elasticity defined over domestic prices, i e , that we use in the estimation, we would need to divide the latter by ) 1 (
However, since output is measured at domestic prices while imports are measured at world prices, we also need to divide i z by ) 1 ( i t + , which is equivalent to saying that we can directly use If India is exogenously constrained so that it cannot increase its applied tariffs, as arguably took place when India committed to reduce its tariffs under the agreement with the IMF, antidumping or safeguard duties could be used as a substitute policy instrument. Therefore, we hypothesize that the antidumping or safeguard duty in 2000 becomes the difference between the unconstrained level that India would have applied (under the Grossman and Helpman model) and the actual applied tariff, i.e., In order to obtain an expression for the antidumping or safeguard duty as a function of India's 1990s applied tariff change, we proceed as follows. First, add year (1990) subscripts to equation (1) to obtain an expression for pre-reform applied tariffs as a function the Grossman and Helpman model's determinants. Then, substituting equations (1) and (2) into (3), we obtain the following expression for the antidumping or safeguard duty in 2000 as, 1990 , 1990 1997 , 1997 2000 , 18 we can then rewrite the previous equation as 
μ is the regression error term. We estimate the Grossman and Helpman model on a cross-section of data, and our unit of observation is an imported product at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) level averaged over 2000/2001. Our dependent variable of antidumping and safeguards protection is defined as the AD/SG measure coverage ratio. We use data at the exporter-product level to calculate the coverage ratio at the product level, with product-specific information on India's AD/SG use derived from Indian government sources as described in the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2007a) . We calculate the coverage ratio as the fraction of total product imports for which an AD/SG measure was imposed, where the weights are the average of imports of the product in 1999 and 2000 deriving from each exporting country. 21 We also complement the baseline specification by estimating the model on a variable defined as the AD/SGinitiation coverage ratio, for which we used AD/SG initiations instead of measures imposed. 21 Let the superscript c denote an exporting country, then the formula for the coverage ratio for import product i is:
, where m denotes imports, t (=2000) is the time subscript, 22 As India does not simply apply antidumping and safeguard measures in the form of ad valorem duties, but instead using complex schemes that include specific duties, price undertakings and minimum import prices, the underlying data does not have available a uniform measure of the size of new import protection. One potential solution is to construct ad valorem equivalents for these measures, but such an exercise is beyond the scope of this paper. We should point out that the use of coverage ratios has the potential problem that it may understate or overstate protection; however, they are considered the best available measure of NTBs when more detailed data is missing. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) also use the NTB coverage ratio as the dependent variable in their tests of the Grossman and Helpman model.
Import data, production, elasticities, and political organization
The Indian data for other variables used to estimate the model derive from a number of sources. First, data on production and elasticities at the 3-digit ISIC level are taken from the World Bank's Trade and Production database (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2007) . Imports at the 6-digit HS level are taken from the UN's Comtrade database made available through WITS.
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As we do not have access to political campaign contribution data for Indian industries, we use two different definitions to determine whether a given sector is politically organized. The first comes from Cadot, Grether, and Olarreaga (2003) and is based on an iterative procedure in which they first estimate a standard Grossman and Helpman equation on Indian data without distinguishing between organized and unorganized sectors. They then use the residuals from this estimation to rank industries, reclassifying those with high residuals as organized before performing a new estimation and repeating the process iteratively until the sum of squares is minimized. They use a search grid to determine the cutoff value used to reclassify an industry as organized.
As a robustness check, we propose an alternative method for classifying whether a sector is organized for the purposes of receiving antidumping or safeguard protection. We identify a sector as being organized if Indian producers of that product have ever filed an antidumping case. We believe that the requirement to file a case and follow the necessary procedures provides a direct way to identify organized sectors. This alternative approach also does not face the problem found in other empirical applications that campaign contributions may understate or overstate trade-related influence activities.
Note finally that, with the exception for the tariff change variable described above, we use the average values of the right-hand side variables in 2000 and 2001 as regressors. Table 3a presents summary statistics for the relevant variables used to estimate the model. 24 We use the concordance files to associate HS products to ISIC industries made available in Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) .
Estimation strategy
The dependent variable of antidumping and safeguard import protection in our model is censored below zero. Furthermore, we have potentially endogenous variables-some of them entering nonlinearly-on the right hand side, which include the output to import ratio, the elasticity, the organization variable and the applied tariff. Finally, the organization variable and the elasticities may be measured with error. The methodology we apply to address these concerns is a Tobit estimation combining the Smith-Blundell (1986) and the Kelejian (1971) approaches. 25 The methodology requires that we use least squares to regress the right-hand-side endogenous variables and their nonlinear transformations on the instruments and then include the residuals from these regressions as additional variables in the original antidumping import protection equation. 26 The instruments can include the exogenous variables, as well as their quadratic terms and cross-products.
Our instruments are primarily industry characteristic data, and our choice is motivated by previous tests of the model on other countries and trade policy settings. The variables used to instrument for the political organization variable include the number of establishments (a measure of concentration), value added per firm, the share of output sold as intermediate goods, the capital stock and the number of employees. The instruments for the output to import ratio include factor shares, such as the share of capital, skilled labor, land, and natural resources; and the capital-labor ratio. Since variables that affect imports also affect the elasticity of import demand, these are also used as instruments for the elasticity.
Finally, given that tariffs in the Grossman and Helpman framework are also determined by the 25 Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2006) also use this procedure, although the first only reports the two-stage least square results. Although we cannot take the elasticity to the lefthand side of the protection equation as done by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) (see equation 4) , the elasticity estimates that we use have much greater precision, with nearly all of them being significant at least at the 5 percent level. A number of papers adopt the approach of leaving the elasticity on the right-hand side, including Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) . 26 Including the residuals corrects for endogeneity in the corresponding variables and all the coefficients become consistent. If the residuals are statistically significant we can reject the null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous.
organization, output-import and elasticity variables, we use their instruments as instruments for the applied tariff. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient of the 1990-1997 tariff change (i.e., 4 β ) is negative and statistically significant. Therefore, we conclude that there is evidence that the products which experienced larger tariff reductions during the trade liberalization period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) are also the ones that received higher protection in the form of AD or SG measures in 2000/2001. 28 This is a potentially important result that we explore in more detail below, as it indicates that at least part of the trade liberalization undertaken by India was reversed with the later re-application of import-restricting measures through new protection.
The rest of table 4 presents a number of initial robustness checks on our results. For example, in specification 2 we redefine the dependent variable. Instead of defining it as the coverage ratio of imports affected by AD/SG measures, we define it as the coverage ratio of imports affected by the initiation of AD/SG investigations, as prior research (e.g., Staiger and Wolak, 1994) has found the mere initiation of an investigation can be sufficient to have a destructive effect on imports. The results are qualitatively similar and also quantitatively close to those discussed above, which is not surprising given our discussion in section 2 that such a large majority of Indian antidumping investigations result in the imposition of new trade-restricting measures.
Column 3 presents a specification in which we modify the benchmark model and redefine the indicator variable for whether an Indian industry is organized. Instead of using the Cadot, Grether, and
Olarreaga (2003) procedure, we classify a sector as being organized if it ever filed an AD case. 29 In this specification we find that both the coefficient of ( )
and the coefficient of ( ) i i z ε are significant at the 1 percent level. In addition, we find that the sum of their coefficients is positive, as predicted by the model. 30 The coefficient on the applied tariff is now negative, as expected, although not statistically significant. Finally, the coefficient of the 1990-1997 tariff change is again negative and statistically significant, as predicted by the theory.
In column 4 of table 4 we again redefine the dependent variable. Here we define the coverage ratio as the share of imports affected by antidumping measures only (instead of antidumping and safeguard measures), and the rest of the specification is identical to that presented in column 1. Most of 29 Note that out of the sectors that we classify as organized (unorganized) following this criterion, 60 percent (63 percent) were also organized (unorganized) under the Cadot, Grether, and Olarreaga (2003) classification.
30 However, we should point out that the residual of the first right-hand side variable is statistically significant, indicating that we can reject the exogeneity of that regressor. This is probably due to the use of our classification of organized industries, which is more correlated with the dependent variable than the one from Cadot, Grether, and Olarreaga (2003) .
the results are unchanged from specification 1; the exception is that the coefficient on the first variable, ( )
, is no longer statistically significant.
Additional sensitivity analysis to the Grossman and Helpman model
In this section we discuss the results of some additional robustness tests that are not reported in the β with the Cadot, Grether, and Olarreaga (2003) classification of an organized industry change only in that the first variable (I x z/e), which was significant at 10% becomes not significant. The results with our classification of industry organization are similar to those reported in the text.
Alternative Estimation Framework and Results
Probit model
The second step of our approach is to estimate an alternative model of determinants of India's product- In this section we therefore exploit an additionally available margin of the Indian data and estimate determinants of an industry-level decision of whether to use antidumping protection against a particular imported product from a particular exporter country. 32 We use a binomial probit model to thus estimate a reduced form relationship between political-economy determinants of antidumping protection and a binary dependent variable that is equal to one if India faced initiation of an antidumping investigation over a particular 6-digit HS product from a particular exporting country during 2000/2001.
This framework takes advantage of the fact that antidumping protection can be exporter specific -an implication being that there may be foreign country-specific determinants (e.g., variation across exporter sources) affecting the process.
This section thus differs from the first approach in that we do not estimate a structural model, but instead we construct explanatory variables to proxy for political economy determinants of antidumping use that prior researchers have found to affect the process when examining its use by other countries. 32 In this section we present the intuitive discussion of exporter-specific protection in terms of antidumping given that a safeguard is statutorily supposed to be applied across all exporters of a given product on an MFN basis. Nevertheless, in practice a safeguard can be applied in quite a discriminatory fashion as well (e.g., Bown and McCulloch, 2003) . We confirm as a robustness check that including safeguard use does not substantially affect the results, controlling in the estimation for whether a particular exporting country was targeted by (or exempted from) each particular Indian safeguard import restriction.
Nevertheless, our primary focus continues to be an investigation of whether there is a link between India's tariff reductions in 1990-1997 and the subsequent initiation of antidumping cases in 2000/2001.
Variable construction, additional data, and theoretical predictions
While the unit of observation is defined at the 6-digit HS product-exporting country level for India's imported products in 2000/2001, for data availability reasons, our explanatory variables are constructed at one of three levels of aggregation. Some determinants vary by product and exporter, some vary by product only, and some are only available at the industry level.
Consider the potential determinants that vary by product and exporter. First, we use the 1999 value of 6-digit HS imports, expecting larger imports to increase the probability of initiating an antidumping investigation. Second, we construct an indicator variable that equals one if the foreign exporting industry had filed its own antidumping initiation against Indian exports in a 6-digit HS product within the same 4-digit ISIC industry within the last five years. This variable is constructed from data in the Global Antidumping Database and is designed to capture the potential for India's import-competing industries that also export to be targeting foreign competitors with antidumping so as to retaliate against being the target of antidumping use abroad. Third, we construct an indicator variable that equals one if India had initiated an antidumping investigation on that product-exporter pair before 2000. This variable may capture one of two competing effects. If our other variables are able to control for the fundamental determinants of product-level pursuit of antidumping, we expect that the coefficient on this variable would be negative, i.e., receipt of antidumping protection in the past decreases imports and the probability that the industry needs new protection from the same exporter, ceteris paribus. However, a positive sign on this coefficient may indicate that there is some product-specific component that is not otherwise being captured through our other covariates that makes past users of antidumping more likely to request new use. For example, this may occur given that antidumping and safeguard applications can occur at the 8-digit level and there may be multiple 8-digit HS products within a single 6-digit HS category.
We have two additional variables that vary by product but not by exporter. The first is the applied tariff averaged over 2000/2001. A higher tariff is expected to be negatively related to the probability of initiating a case, as it indicates that the product currently receives a higher level of protection. Second, our primary variable of interest is the product-level tariff change from 1990-1997. Once again, the tariff change is expected to have a negative coefficient, as a larger tariff reduction would increase the incentive for the producers to file a case in order to seek alternative protection in the form of AD or SG measures.
Finally, in our baseline regression we include a number of industry level (ISIC 3-digit) variables that do not vary by exporter and for which there will be multiple 6-digit HS products: i.e., output, the number of employees, the number of establishments, and the elasticity of import demand, all taken from the Trade and Production database (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2007) . A higher output is expected to be positively related to the probability of initiating an AD/SG case, as it means that the producers have more to gain from protection and also may have more resources to support the AD investigation costs. The number of employees may proxy for political influence and is also expected to have a positive impact on the probability of AD initiation. The number of establishments is inversely related to concentration in the industry (which is likely to affect the ability to overcome the free-rider problem) and is therefore expected to reduce the probability of an initiation. The elasticity of import demand-in absolute value-is directly related to the deadweight loss associated with protection, and thus we expect a higher elasticity to reduce the probability of initiating a case, as long as producers perceive that a measure would be less likely to be imposed given its larger social cost. Since the actual and not the absolute value of the variable is used in the estimation, we expect a positive sign for its coefficient.
As a final consideration, we note that the Indian government's use of these particular importrestricting polices also, in principle, requires legal justification in the form of petitioning industries providing evidence that they have faced dumped imports and are injured (antidumping) or are at least injured (safeguards). To address the potential concern of omitted variables bias, in our preferred specifications we also include 4-digit ISIC industry fixed effects to control for changing market conditions at the industry level that may be associated with evidence of dumping and injury. One implication of including such effects in the probit analysis is that in such specifications we focus only on the cross-product variation within antidumping-using industries.
The summary statistics for each of the variables used in the probit analysis, as well as the expected sign of their impact on the antidumping initiation outcome variable, is illustrated in table 3b.
4.3
Estimates from the probit model Table 5 reports estimated marginal effects of the probit model. In addition to the determinants already discussed, in all specifications we also include exporting country fixed effects to control for the concern that exporting countries such as China are more likely to be targeted across products (Bown, 2007b) .
Specification (5) is our baseline specification. While this is not our preferred specification because it does not also include industry-level fixed effects, the coefficient estimates from the model provide evidence that is nevertheless generally consistent with predictions of the theory. though it is not statistically different from zero. 34 Finally, the one variable whose estimated effect runs counter to the theory is the elasticity of import demand, which has a coefficient estimate that is negative.
Column 6 of table 5 presents our preferred specification in which we also control for unobserved industry-level heterogeneity through 4-digit ISIC industry fixed effects. The first item to note is that this reduces our sample size by two thirds, as our use of a binary dependent variable and the probit model implies we are now only able to exploit the cross-product variation within those industries that used 
Additional sensitivity analysis
Columns 7 through 9 present a number of additional robustness checks to the estimation. In column 7, we redefine the dependent variable to be a binary indicator taking on a value of one if there is an AD or SG initiation facing a given product-exporter pair in 2000/2001. 37 In specification 8, we redefine the tariff 34 We also tried replacing this indicator with an indicator of whether there was an AD measure against that exporterproduct pair still in force in 2000 (from an initiation before 2000), and the results are very similar. 35 Once we add the 4-digit ISIC fixed effects, all of the variables defined at the 3-digit ISIC level (e.g., output, employment, establishments, elasticity) are dropped from the estimation. 36 The results are robust to shortening the period used to define the retaliation indicator to include initiations against India since 1998 or 1999 only.
37 Even though the SG is supposed to be applied on an MFN basis, as noted above, many exporting countries are frequently exempted from the policy for a number of reasons (Bown and McCulloch, 2003) . In the case of India's application of SG during this time period, for example, it exempted a number of de minimus developing country exporters from the SG. To reflect this feature of the policy, we thus treat these particular exporters of the product also as if they did not face the SG investigation either. Note that in this specification the AD previous-initiation indicator is replaced with one based on previous AD or SG initiations. The sample size increases because we were able to include some 4-digit ISIC industries that were users of a SG -but that were not users of AD -in 2000 AD -in /2001 change variable. Instead of using the absolute difference in tariff levels in 1997 and 1990, in this specification we measure it as the difference between those tariffs (each scaled by 100) divided by one plus the average of the tariffs. 38 Finally, in column (9), we report estimates from a linear probability model instead of the binomial probit. This specification is designed to address the econometric concern that the use of fixed effects in non-linear models has the potential problem that the estimators may be inconsistent. 39 Nevertheless, as the table indicates, the key results are unchanged under each of these different sensitivity checks.
In addition to the sensitivity analysis illustrated in table 5, we have undertaken a number of other robustness checks. First, we included as an explanatory variable the difference between the applied and the bound tariff rate in 2000, defined as a percentage of the applied rate. We expect that this variable (frequently referred to as "tariff overhang") would have a negative coefficient, i.e., that a smaller difference indicates less flexibility for India to increase its applied tariff in 2000 while remaining consistent with its WTO obligations and thus increasing the probability of AD or SG protection. While the coefficient on this variable was negative and statistically significant, the result was not robust to the way in which the variable was defined (e.g., level differences versus percentage differences, etc.). More importantly, including this variable also did not significantly affect the estimates of the primary variables of interest either. , 1997 or 1992) . These alternative specifications also did not result in any underlying changes on the coefficients of interest.
38 Specifically, we redefine the tariff change variable to be ( 
Economic significance of the estimated effects
While the estimated effects on the variables of interest in table 5 are statistically significant, are they economically important determinants of antidumping use? First note that, using our preferred specification 6 from table 5, the predicted probability of an antidumping initiation is 0.0043 when the estimated coefficients are evaluated at the mean value of each explanatory variable. In terms of the size of the estimated marginal effects estimates, a 1 percentage point increase in the tariff reduction between 1990 and 1997 increases the probability of initiating an investigation by 0.000050 (or approximately 1 percent of the predicted probability value). Given the large tariff reductions that actually took place in India during that period -e.g., the mean in the sample is 50 percentage points and the standard deviation is 40 percentage points -these estimates are economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the tariff reduction away from its mean implies a predicted increase in the probability of a 2000/2001 investigation by 0.0022, i.e., a 51 percent increase in the predicted probability of an investigation.
Furthermore, the estimated marginal effect of the retaliation variable is also economically sizable.
A product is 1.4 percentage points more likely to initiate an antidumping investigation if it is an India import from a trading partner that has hit an Indian export in the same industry with its own antidumping.
The size of this effect is also quite large, given that the predicted probability of an antidumping initiation is 0.0043 when the estimated coefficients are evaluated at the means.
Industry-level analysis
In table 5 significant evidence that products within industrial chemicals that are imported from countries which have themselves targeted antidumping against Indian exports of industrial chemicals products will be more likely to face an Indian antidumping investigation. This effect is also positive, although not statistically significant, for products in the steel industry. Nevertheless, this is consistent with the theory that antidumping can also be used to enforce collusive, market segmenting arrangements -as has frequently been alleged in reasonably concentrated global industries such as chemicals and steel. 40 We proceed sequentially in this section because many fewer Indian industries are targeted by foreign antidumping use, which cause them to drop out of specification (11).
Duration of antidumping measures and trade liberalization
As a final exercise, we examine an additional margin along which we expect to observe a relationship between the size of India's 1990s tariff cuts and antidumping protection -i.e., the duration of time that antidumping measures remain in place providing protection to the domestic industry. While we have illustrated evidence that, on average, India was more likely to use antidumping in the early 2000s in products that had larger tariff cuts over 1990-1997, is the Indian government also providing a longer spell of import protection to products that suffered larger tariff cuts?
We can provide some preliminary evidence consistent with this effect. Consider the set of all products in India that received antidumping protection prior to 2001 -i.e., products for which sufficient time elapsed for us to have data regarding whether their antidumping protection was removed prior to the WTO-mandated 5 year period under its "Sunset Review" provisions. Calculate the mean percentage tariff reduction from 1990-1997 for those 6-digit HS products that had their AD measures removed within five years versus products that had the measures extended beyond five years. 41 We find that the average 1990-1997 tariff reduction was 64 percent for products with measures revoked within the five year period, while it was 76 percent for products which had AD measures extended beyond five years. 42 We conclude that "temporary" antidumping protection may be more likely to become "quasi-permanent" protection, the larger was the product's original tariff cut as well.
Summary and implications of results
The result of an empirical link between the size of Indian tariff cuts in the 1990s and subsequent resort to antidumping and safeguards is potentially important as it indicates that at least part of its trade liberalization was reversed by the reapplication of new forms of import protection via exceptions 41 We calculate this as the difference in the tariffs from 1997 and 1990 divided by their average. 42 This differential is statistically significant at the 10 percent level for all sectors combined. We test the null hypothesis that the means are equal against the alternative that the average tariff cut is larger for products with AD measures lasting more than 5 years. For the industrial chemicals sector alone, for which we found that retaliation may have played a predominant role, there is also a difference though it is not statistically significant. Finally, our results also suggest a caveat for the emerging literature that uses India's 1990s tariff reductions alone to study the impact of trade liberalization. In particular, our result of a relationship between the size of the tariff reduction and subsequent use of antidumping and safeguards in a number of economically sizable sectors indicates less dispersion in the actual reduction of protection across products than in the tariff-only data that many prior studies have used. 43 While much of this research examines data from the period prior to India's run in up in antidumping and safeguard use, in the least, our results identify a caveat for future research seeking to extend this approach to more recent time periods.
Conclusion
This paper uses India's exogenously-induced tariff reform in the 1990s to test the theory of a relationship between trade liberalization and the imposition of new import protection via WTO-permitted policy exceptions such as safeguards and antidumping. We exploit cross-product variation and provide evidence that India's resort to antidumping and safeguard protection in 2000/2001 is related to the size of its tariff reform in 1990-1997 -i.e., the larger the tariff cut, the more likely was the product to subsequently seek and receive new import protection under these policy exceptions. These results derive from structural estimates of a modified Grossman and Helpman (1994) model, and they are confirmed by reduced-form specifications able to exploit larger samples and additional margins of the underlying data. Our results have important implications for understanding India's import market access reforms in the 1990s, as tariff changes are increasingly used to study the impact of trade liberalization on development in areas such as productivity, poverty, and labor demand.
43 See again the literature in footnote 8. Note that we also found that 91 percent of the AD/SG initiations from 1992-2004 were in industries in which the standard deviation of the tariff cut was larger than the median for all industries.
Our evidence is consistent with theories of trade agreements as a commitment device (e.g., Staiger and Tabellini, 1987; Rodriguez-Clare 1998, 2007) and the concern that policy exceptions such as safeguards and antidumping reduce the credibility of trade liberalization announcements. Nevertheless, despite the Indian setting providing an excellent natural experiment allowing investigation of a product-level link between the size of the Indian tariff cuts and its subsequent resort to such safeguard exceptions, there are important limits to how to interpret our results. Neither our approach nor our results allow us to make the bold claim that India's knowledge of ex post access to "exceptions" via antidumping or safeguards served to facilitate its trade liberalizing tariff cuts ex ante. Furthermore, our product-level focus does not allow us to rule out other theories of such policy exceptions (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 1990) . For example, we do not test whether India's selective, product-level use of antidumping and safeguards was an escape valve preventing a spillover of new protectionism to other products thus maintaining a broader program of trade liberalization.
Finally, while we find economically and statistically significant effects of the tariff cuts on average, we identify substantial heterogeneity of the size of this result across sectors. In particular, we find tariff cuts are an important determinant of antidumping and safeguard use for products within the steel, iron and paper industries. While these industries are frequent users of these policies and large importers, nevertheless, we do not find evidence of such an effect within industrial chemicals, which is India's dominant user of antidumping and safeguards during this period. However, we provide strong evidence that retaliatory or collusive effects intended to discipline foreign competitors may drive crossproduct use within industrial chemicals. This result, in particular, speaks to the flexibility that access to antidumping and safeguard policies provide policymakers and industries, as well as the lack of discipline that the WTO rules on these polices had on constraining their use in India during this time period. 
Year
Source: Authors' calculations using data from Bown (2007a) . Note that India's antidumping statute was established in 1985, although its first investigation did not take place until 1992. India's safeguard statute was established in 1997, and its first safeguard investigation took place in that year. Notes: a, b, and c indicate that the variable was scaled by 10,000,000, 10,000 and 100, respectively. Number of observations is 35471. Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 6-digit HS product level in parentheses where *, **, and *** indicate statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. a, b, and c indicate that the variable was scaled by 10,000,000, 10,000 and 100, respectively. 1/ Variable equals 1 if there is at least one AD/SG initiation in 2000 or 2001. 2/ Observations are cross section of 6-digit HS product-exporter combinations. Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 6-digit HS product level in parentheses where *, **, and *** indicate statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. a and b indicate that the variable was scaled by 10,000,000 and 10,000, respectively. 1/ Variable equals 1 if there is at least one AD/SG initiation in 2000 or 2001. 2/ Observations are cross section of 6-digit HS product-exporter combinations.
Appendix: Antidumping Initiations in 1997-1999:
We redid our estimation of equation (4) When estimating the model on this sample of data, the estimated impact of the 1990-1996 tariff change on AD/SG is now positive and significant, a counter-intuitive result. This indicates that products that received smaller tariff reductions from 1990 to 1996 also received higher AD/SG protection during 1997-1999. However, closer inspection of the data reveals a potentially intuitive political economy explanation for this phenomenon -during the 1997-1999 period, the applied tariffs on many products were actually raised (see again the discussion above in section 2.1), and there is a negative correlation in the raw data between the size of the 1990-1996 tariff cut and the 1997-1999 tariff increase. 45 The sectors that engaged in less tariff cutting during 1990-1996 (perhaps because they were politically powerful) were able to raise their tariffs in 1997-1999.
One interpretation of the positive sign of the impact of the tariff cut variable for the [1997] [1998] [1999] period is that there is a complementary nature between trade policy instruments during this time period.
The same industries that were receiving increases in their applied tariffs were also more likely to pursue protection via initiating AD/SG petitions, perhaps as an insurance plan in case their requests for applied tariff increases were denied. 44 We use the applied tariff from 1997, as we do not have tariff data for 1998 or 1999. We also tried using the average of the tariffs from 1997 and 2000 and the results did not change much. 45 For example, during this period the percentage of products with tariff increases was actually higher than the percentage of products with tariff reductions (see also Topalova, 2006) . Note that in unreported results, we also estimated similar specifications of our reduced form probit model on data from the 1997 to 1999 period. The results regarding the tariff change are similar to those obtained in our estimation of the Grossman and Helpman model for the same period. Again, our interpretation of this result is that during 1997-1999 period applied tariffs were changing and actually increasing for several products, thus signaling a period of a complementary relationship between increased tariff protection and increased antidumping and safeguards protection.
Because applied tariffs themselves were changing in 1997-1999 in India, we conclude that it was not a particularly "clean" period to examine our question of interest regarding the link between trade liberalization and subsequent resort to antidumping and safeguards. Hence the body of the paper focuses our model estimates on the 2000/2001 period. Notes: Standard errors of the tobit model's estimates are in parentheses with *, **, and *** indicating statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 1/ Calculated as the share of imports for which there was a measure/initiation in any year from 1997-1999. 2/ Observations are cross section of 6-digit HS products.
